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Abstract
The purpose of the article is to test the relationship between national identities and moderni-
sation. We test the hypotheses that not all forms of identity are equally compatible with mod-
ernisation as measured by Human Development Index. The less developed societies are
characterised by strong ascribed national identities based on birth, territory and religion, but
also by strong voluntarist identities based on civic features selected and/or achieved by an
individual. While the former decreases with further modernisation, the latter may either
decrease or remain at high levels and coexist with instrumental supranational identifica-
tions, typical for the most developed countries. The results, which are also confirmed by
multilevel regression models, thus demonstrate that increasing modernisation in terms of
development contributes to the shifts from classical, especially ascribed, identities towards
instrumental identifications. These findings are particularly relevant in the turbulent times
increasingly dominated by the hardly predictable effects of the recent mass migrations.
Introduction
People may feel the belonging to their societies in various ways, ranging from strong blood kin-
ship relationships, typical for the tribal communities, to the pragmatic, instrumental motives,
usually linked to the modern (post) industrial societies. Although nations and national identi-
ties are usually seen as a product of modernity [1,2], the ways, in which they are felt and experi-
enced, are not necessarily compatible with the features of a modern society. The purpose of
this article is to identify the different or even opposing types of national identity and test their
relationship with a developed modern society [3,4]. Based on the existing theory and empirical
survey data we intend to distinguish between:
1. ascribed national identities based on birth, territoriality and religion
2. voluntarist national identities based more on choices and achievements
3. instrumental trans- and supranational identifications
We hypothesise that the exclusivist nature of the first contradicts modernity and thus
declines with the further social development; the second may be compatible with modernity
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but there is no elective affinity between the two phenomena; while the third will only increase
with the rise of modern development. It will thus be tested, whether modern development also
generates different types of national identities.
We intend to measure modernity in quantitative terms using the well-established United
Nations measure of Human Development Index (HDI) [5] as a combination of material wel-
fare, health and education. Identity measures, on the other hand, will be based on the indices
developed from the available survey data from the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) [6,7] and the Eurobarometer [8].
National Identity and Modernity
National identities are clearly related to modernity, which has contributed to the generation of
the national imagined communities in terms of Benedict Anderson [1]. They are not an ‘objec-
tive’ structural feature but more a perspective of individuals and groups to observe, understand
and reflect themselves in a social context. The issue is particularly relevant in the turbulent
times of globalisation, mass migrations, intercultural clashes and their hardly predictable
effects well illustrated by the recent refugee crisis in Europe.National identities are clearly
related to modernity, which has contributed to the generation of the national imagined com-
munities in terms of Benedict Anderson [1]. They are not an ‘objective’ structural feature but
more a perspective of individuals and groups to observe, understand and reflect themselves in
a social context. The issue is particularly relevant in the turbulent times of globalisation, mass
migrations, intercultural clashes and their hardly predictable effects well illustrated by the
recent refugee crisis in Europe.This semantic shift corresponded well to the break with the
semantic of the pre-modern stratified society—replacing the old hierarchically based semantic
distinction between the feudal aristocracy and its subjects with the distinction between differ-
ent ‘peoples’ thus developing their particular (national) identities. However, although national
identities have initially clearly corresponded to the origins of modernity, the relationship
between the two phenomena is more complicated, since all kinds of national identity are not
necessary compatible with the further development of modern society. In general, modernity is
clearly related to the concepts of inclusion. This implies that individuals are supposed to be
included in all functional subsystems of the society [5,6], which is also well reflected in the
Enlightenment based values of freedom and equality—as clear guiding principles of modern
societies [7].On the other hand, the national semantics seems to be inevitably different. Ini-
tially, a person has been supposed to belong fully to a single nation implying certain exclusivity
both at the social and at the personal side. The semantics defining national belonging in terms
of “insiders” and “outsiders” includes different “ethnic philosophies” [8], which condition the
two broad principal models of the nation state: the French universalist and the German refer-
ring to a cultural particularity [9]. Resembling those conceptions, Smith [10] defines the civic-
territorial and the ethnic-genealogical model of the nation. It may be argued that the differ-
ences between the models may be understood as competing semantics.While the nation based
divisions are communicated within the social system and self-described in terms of national
identity semantics, it should be noted that the self-description of individuals also includes a
semantic of their own (national) identities and belongings and of attributing them to others
[11]. The transformations in the semantics referring to national belongings have thus occurred
both at the individual and the social level. With the increasing complexity of the social systems
[12], individuals have been entering a variety of subsystems and become confronted with the
multiple meanings produced by communication, which have had certain impact on individu-
als’ cognition. Social systems and individuals should be seen as two emergent units having
their own causal powers [13]. Mutual influences are restricted to the structural level of both
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systems, which determines the reproduction, meaning that “both types of systems are structur-
ally adapted to each other in a way which allows for mutual irritation” [14]. In that regard, the
important role is played by “trigger-causality” [6,14], meaning that individual is a trigger to
social systems, whose structures respond in their own specific way of reproduction, and vice
versa. Social system is a trigger to cognition of individual, who responds in her or his own spe-
cific way. Individuals’ social embeddedness reflects the variety of social environments, which
have a potential to ‘trigger’ them. The link between social forces (expressing all possible triggers
of environments provided by social system) and individuals is made by confrontation between
communication, which is an emergent property of social systems, and thoughts, cognition of
individuals.In order to cope with growing modernisation, the reduction of meanings in self-
description of social systems has brought to communication, which supports certain transfor-
mations in national belongings. Resulting from the interplay between emergent structural
properties of social systems and individuals, one can notice the semantics of individuals’ self-
describing in terms of national belongings have responded to those structural transformations.
Individuals have begun to express different forms of national identity but they are not all
equally compatible with further modernisation.
Transforming National Belongings: The Framework of This Study
The result of structural coupling between cultural information instigated by cognitive frames,
determined by social structure, and individuals’ cognition can be understood in terms of cul-
tural memory. The latter is characterised by its distance from the everyday and preserves the
store of knowledge of unity and peculiarity of one group [15]. National identities reflect the
semantics of self-describing referring to a cultural memory, which is seen as a particular form
of mediated action of human agents who make use of cultural repertoires or so-called cultural
tools. The availability of cultural tool kits depends on agents’ position in social structure spe-
cific to a certain time and place [16]. Even within the classical social order, the distinction in
the semantics of identity can be observed: between the ascribed and the voluntarist criteria of
national belonging, where—as we shall hypothesise—only the relative inclusiveness of the latter
may be compatible with development in terms of modernisation (since the semantics related to
modernity also implies inclusiveness). The classical social order may thus be seen as early mod-
ernisation since the emerging semantics of national identity already reflects a shift away from
the pre-modern stratified social system. Regarding the classical social order, we thus hypothe-
sise that the ascribed national identities are the most typical for the least developed societies,
lagging behind in terms of modernisation (Hypothesis 1), while the voluntarist national identi-
ties are compatible—though not necessarily correlated with modern development (Hypothesis
2). On the other hand, in an emerging social order of the more developed, so called second
modernity [17], manifested through further human and social development, the semantics or
cultural information has become multiple, often contested and ambiguous. The increasing
number of variations of the social systems provides a new environment for the individuals, in
which meanings become routinely questioned and ‘irritate’ the individuals’ noise. Particular
narratives and images are not just reproduced and reframed [18], but often put into question
through new cultural information playing a protagonist role in the construction of identities,
which can be individual or collective. Changed cultural information provides a construction of
new memories, which respond to contemporary cultural complexities [18]. The transformed
processes of memory transmission can be understood by using Benjamin’s distinction between
‘transmitted’ and ‘acquired’memory. The construction of new memories refers to acquired
memory denoting what happens to individual alone, and it has becoming more and more sig-
nificant in human lives [19]. Excessive number of choices and high risk-taking resulting from
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increasing complexity of society demand rapid and efficient adaptation of individuals to their
environment. Self-description in terms of contemporary identifications is a means of reducing
instability and hyper complexity of meanings. Globalisation processes have changed the mate-
rial and imaginary relationship toward space generating the self-descriptions of imagined com-
munities reaching beyond Anderson’s conceptualisation of nation state [1]. The classical
meanings of ‘the nation’ can no longer be the principal site of frame of cultural memory
because the new acquired memories refer more to post-national cultural constellations [18]. In
the emerging social order, one can thus construct instrumental transnational or even suprana-
tional identifications, which co-exist with the national ones. The semantics referring to
ascribed elements of national belongings is of different nature as in the classical social order
and support the efficient adaptation of individuals to the environment [20–22]. Common
myths, origin and the idea of the territorial homeland are for instance a powerful source instru-
mentalised by transnational diasporic communities. Unfortunately, the available survey data
does not allow us to test the relationship between this type of identity and modernisation,
which thus remains a challenge for further research.
A step further is taken by supranational instrumental identifications that are based on prag-
matic choices and fall fully in line with the decreasing relevance of the national borders and the
supranational nature of the functional subsystems [20,23], well-illustrated by the case of the
European Union. We hypothesise that these types of identity semantics are not only compati-
ble but even positively correlated to the further development of modern society (Hypothesis 3).
The typology of identity constructions, their relationship with the development of modernity
and the specification of our hypotheses are presented in Table 1.
Analysis: Indicators of national identity
The link between the individuals and social systems and their self-descriptions in terms of
identity, briefly explained in sections 2 and 3, is required not only for theoretical clarification
but also for the operationalisation needed for empirical testing of our hypotheses. This is at
least because the social semantics of national identity is measured in social surveys at the level
of individual responses. A potentially possible replacement of individual level analysis with (e.
g. national) statistical aggregates would simplify the analysis but it would also imply a signifi-
cant (and unnecessary) loss of information, since different individuals may participate in social
systems in various ways and may thus also reflect the semantic of national identity in a broad
variety of ways. We intend to test, through correlation and hierarchical regression methods
[24], whether modern development also generates different types of national identities. The
dataset from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) from 2003, is a part of a
Table 1. A typology of identity constructions.
Types of identity semantics Hypotheses: compatibility / relationship with
development
Classical
social order
Classical ascribed national identity: ﬁrm national identity, transferred inter-
generationally, e.g. ethno-nationalism.
Hypothesis 1: low compatibility—expecting signiﬁcant
negative statistical relationship.
Classical voluntarist national identity: Firm civic identity, strong sense of
inclusive citizenship, e.g. U.S. or French patriotism.
Hypothesis 2: medium compatibility—expecting no
signiﬁcant statistical relationship between the
phenomena.
Emerging
social order
Instrumental transnational identiﬁcations: Instrumentalisation of national
traditions, re-inventing or searching for national (ethnic) roots, e.g. among the
next generations of immigrants.
Not tested due to unavailable survey data. Medium
compatibility may be expected.
Instrumental supranational identiﬁcations: Instrumental identiﬁcation based
on pragmatic choices, e.g. EU citizenship.
Hypothesis 3: high compatibility—expecting signiﬁcant
positive statistical relationship.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.t001
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continuing annual programme of cross-national surveys covering important topics for social
science research [25]. It contains several variables regarding the criteria of national identity, i.e.
the criteria considered as important by the respondents to define a person to belong to a certain
nation. They are listed in the first column of as Table 2. Confirming strong correlations
between some of them we performed Principal Component Analysis. Results showed that by
the two extracted components 58% of total variance was explained. Based on this, two separate
components were detected in an almost identical manner [26] on the previous ISSP dataset
from 1995 [27]. In line with Smith and Jones [26] and our own definitions explained in section
3 (see Table 1; the rows regarding Classical Social Order), we interpreted these two components
as (1) ascribed criteria and (2) voluntarist criteria. As presented in Table 2, the first (ascribed)
component has high loadings of being born in the country (variable Born in our analysis), liv-
ing there for most of one’s life (variable MostLife) and belonging to the dominant religion (var-
iable Religion). The second (voluntarist) component, on the other hand, has high loadings for
respecting the country’s political institutions and laws (Institutions), the feeling of country’s
nationality (Feel) and being able to speak the language (Language). Citizenship has a more
ambivalent meaning, which is hardly surprising because of its combined nature: being ‘a civic’
element on the one hand but also strongly conditioned by birth and long-term residence in a
given country (see Table 2).
However, the operationalization of the national identity and its intensity is a more compli-
cated issue than implied by Smith and Jones [26]. What the variables presented in Table 2 actu-
ally measure is the significance attributed to various criteria applied when considering others
as members or non-members of a particular imagined (national) community. On the other
hand, these elements as such tell nothing about the intensity of individuals’ own feelings of
national identity and the relevance of national identity for them. For instance, an individual
who claims that that birth and residence are important for national identity does not necessar-
ily believe that national identity as such is important.
A proper indicator of intensity of national feelings may be found in the same dataset under
the question on ‘how close’ one feels to one’s country (variable CloseCountry). We should thus
combine the question of intensity of national belonging (CloseCountry) with the set of ques-
tions regarding the criteria of national belonging (as presented in Table 2) in order to establish
the indices of ascribed and voluntaristic national identity. The combination is based on the
multiplication of each criterion with the general intensity measured by the CloseCountry vari-
able and summing them up for the overall assessment. We assume that the variables distributed
into the two categories established through the principal component analysis presented in
Table 2. Principal Component Analysis—Rotated Component Matrix of national belonging criteria.
Source: ISSP Research Group 2003 [25]; own calculations.
Component
1 ‘ascribed
criteria’
2 ‘voluntarist
criteria’
Important: to have been born in [Country] 0,838 0,102
Important: To have [Country Nationality] citizenship 0,641 0,422
Important: To have lived in [Country] for most of one's life 0,752 0,277
Important: To be able to speak [Country language] 0,283 0,632
Important: To be a [religion] 0,652 0,057
Important: To respect [Country Nationality] political institutions
and laws
-0,057 0,840
Important: To feel [Country Nationality] 0,353 0,635
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.t002
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Table 2 all equally contribute to the each of the two types of national identity. Feelings of differ-
ent individuals may involve different weights but there is no persuasive theoretical or empirical
argument that would support a single variable being more important in general than any other.
Consequently, we put equal weights to all variables of the national identity types (or criteria)
since different weights would be arbitrary. The citizenship criterion was deliberately left from
the index formation since it is not—as we have noted above—clearly positioned into either the
ascribed or the voluntarist dimension. The criteria for national belonging measured originally
at the Likert scale ranging from 1 to 4 were for the purpose of our analysis recoded into: 2 for
seeing a given feature as ‘very important’, 1 for seeing it as ‘important’, 0 ‘for seeing it as ‘not
very important’ and -1 for seeing it as ‘not important at all’. This implies that a given criterion
can be strongly emphasised (value 2), seen as relevant (value 1), not seen as relevant (value 0)
or even seen as something that should not be considered at all (value -1). One’s closeness to
one’s country measured originally at the Likert scale ranging from 1 to 4, was recoded into: 2
(‘very close’), 1 (‘close’) and 0 for either ‘not very close’ or ‘not close at all’. This implies that
national identity in relation to the country where a person lives may be very intensive (value 2),
existing but not very intensive (value 1) or non-existent (value 0). For the purpose of our analy-
sis we have deliberately ignored the difference between ‘not very close’ and ‘not close at all’
since it is not our intention to measure ‘negative’ national identities in terms of rejecting one’s
country—such identities are only seen here as the lack of national identity. Based on these con-
siderations and values, the Ascribed National Identity Index (Ascribed) and Voluntarist
National Identity Index (Voluntarist) were calculated as follows:
Ascribed ¼ CloseCountry  ðBornþMostLifeþ ReligionÞ ð1Þ
Voluntarist ¼ CloseCountry  ðLanguageþ Institutions þ FeelÞ ð2Þ
Finally, in order to assess the presence of supranational identities that may be typical for the
emergent order described in Section 3 (see Table 1, the row on ‘supranational identifications’),
we took the distinction from Eurobarometer 2012 dataset [28] between the persons who feel
themselves as European citizens and the rest as an indicator of supranational identity (EUCIT).
Thus we created a dichotomous variable with the value of 1 for those who considered them-
selves as the EU citizens and 0 for those who did not.
Results
The relationships between development and identity are presented in Fig 1 for Ascribed
National Identity and Fig 2 for Voluntarist National identity. The scatterplot in Fig 1 clearly
demonstrates the decreasing ascribed national identity with the higher levels of development.
Fig 2, on the other hand, indicates inevitably high levels of voluntarist identity at lower levels of
development, while the results for highly developed nations may vary from quite low to quite
high levels of voluntarist identity. In other words, with modern development, ascribed national
identity decreases (making it incompatible with modern development), while the voluntarist
may either decrease or not (making it compatible with modern development since the negative
statistical correlation is only caused by the consistently high levels of voluntarist national iden-
tities at the low levels of human development). Regarding the supranational instrumental iden-
tifications of the emerging social order, EU countries with higher HDI are more likely to
demonstrate higher levels of supranational identities in terms of feelings of European citizen-
ship [29]. The relationship is presented as a scatterplot in Fig 3.
Although this speaks in favour of our hypotheses, we should perform the analyses at the indi-
vidual level as well. Controlling for the individual socio demographic characteristics, which may
National Development and National Identities
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Fig 1. Human Development and Ascribed National Identity at the national levels. The scatterplot in Fig 1
clearly demonstrates the decreasing ascribed national identity with the higher levels of development.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.g001
Fig 2. Human Development and Voluntarist National Identity at the national levels. Fig 2, on the other
hand, indicates inevitably high levels of voluntarist identity at lower levels of development, while the results for
highly developed nations may vary from quite low to quite high levels of voluntarist identity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.g002
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affect one’s structural position and thus the perception of national identity [10,26], is required.
We should also consider a potential impact of one’s immigrant origins that may generate com-
peting trans-national identifications and contribute to declining classical national identity. For
these purposes we use a two-level hierarchical linear regression HML2 equation available in
HLM7 software with HDI as the second level independent variable as stated bellow:
ACRIBij ¼ g00 þ g01  HDIj þ g10  AGEij þ g20  EDUCYRSij þ g30  FEMALEij þ g40  PNOTCij þ u0j þ rij ð3Þ
where ASCRIB stands for Ascribed National Identity Index, HDI for Human Development
Index, AGE for individual’s age, EDUCYRS for the number of years of completed education,
FEMALE for being a female, PNOTC for respondent’s parents not being citizens of her or his
country (implying a migrant origin), level 2 error term u0j and error term rij.The model in Fig 2
is based on the hypothesis 1 implying that HDI within a given national context will indepen-
dently decrease the levels of ascribed national identity (as the dependent variable in the model)
while controlling for the individuals’ features including age, education, gender and immigrant
origins (see Table 3).
The results in Table 3, presented graphically in Fig 4, confirm the significance of the first
level regression coefficients for all variables included in the model and significant impact of
HDI as the second level variable. HDI with the negative and significant effect confirms that the
macro level HDI variable tends to contribute to the decreasing levels of ascribed national iden-
tity. Moreover, at the individual level the dependent variable is significantly affected by the
immigrant origins of a respondent. It is very likely that an immigrant position generates
Fig 3. Human Development and the feeling of EU citizenship at the national levels.Regarding the
supranational instrumental identifications of the emerging social order, EU countries with higher HDI are
more likely to demonstrate higher levels of supranational identities in terms of feelings of European
citizenship. The relationship is presented as a scatterplot in Fig 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.g003
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competing instrumental cross-national identities instead of classical ascribed national identities
(see Table 1).
A similar model has been constructed for voluntaristic national identity as well, namely:
VOLUNTij ¼ g00 þ g01  HDIj þ g10  AGEij þ g20  EDUCYRSij þ g30  FEMALEij þ g40  PNOTCij þ u0j þ rij ð4Þ
where VOLUNT stands for our Voluntarist National Identity Index.
Table 3. Final estimation of two levels hierarchical regression with Ascribed National Identity Index as outcome variable on individual level.
Fixed Effect Coefﬁcient Standard error t-ratio Approx. d.f. p-value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 3,603 0,236 15,279 30 <0,001
HDI, γ01 -14,705 4,871 -3,019 30 0,005
For AGE slope, β1
INTRCPT2, γ10 0,054 0,001 51,000 42274 <0,001
For EDUCYRS slope, β2
INTRCPT2, γ20 -0,005 0,001 -6,078 42274 <0,001
For FEMALE slope, β3
INTRCPT2, γ30 0,227 0,037 6,165 42274 <0,001
For PNOTC slope, β4
INTRCPT2, γ40 -2,066 0,077 -26,760 42274 <0,001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.t003
Fig 4. The hierarchical regressionmodel for the Ascribed National Identity Index with statistically significant first level regression coefficients. Fig
4, confirm the significance of the first level regression coefficients for all variables included in the model and significant impact of HDI as the second level
variable. HDI with the negative and significant effect confirms that the macro level HDI variable tends to contribute to the decreasing levels of ascribed
national identity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.g004
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The results presented in Table 4, presented graphically in Fig 5, confirm hypothesis 2 since
they demonstrate no relevant impact of HDI on the voluntarist national identity even when
individual level variables (age, education, gender and immigrant origins) are also controlled for.
Finally, the hypothesis 3 was tested using a nonlinear multilevel logistic regression model [30]:
EUCITij ¼ g00 þ g01  HDIj þ g10  AGEij þ g20  EDUCATERij þ g30  FEMALEij þ u0j ð5Þ
where EUCIT stands for the indicator of supranational identity, AGE for
Table 4. Final estimation of two levels hierarchical regression with Voluntarist National Identity Index as outcome variable on individual level.
Fixed Effect Coefﬁcient Standard error t-ratio Approx. d.f. p-value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 5,808 0,202 28,730 30 <0,001
HDI, γ01 -4,056 4,604 -0,881 30 0,385
For AGE slope, β1
INTRCPT2, γ10 0,038 0,003 14,379 42274 <0,001
For EDUCYRS slope, β2
INTRCPT2, γ20 -0,007 0,001 -4,807 42274 <0,001
For FEMALE slope, β3
INTRCPT2, γ30 0,057 0,065 0,877 42274 0,380
For PNOTC slope, β4
INTRCPT2, γ40 -1,181 0,267 -4,423 42274 <0,001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.t004
Fig 5. The hierarchical regressionmodel for the Voluntarist National Identity Index with statistically significant first level regression coefficients.
Fig 5 confirm hypothesis 2 since they demonstrate no relevant impact of HDI on the voluntarist national identity even when individual level variables (age,
education, gender and immigrant origins) are also controlled for.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.g005
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individualpranatioEDUCYRS for the number of years of completed education, FEMALE for
being a female and level 2 error term u0j.
While controlling for the (significant) effects of age, gender and education, the independent
positive effect of HDI on supranational identity was confirmed as showed in Table 5. It may
thus be claimed that HDI contributes to the semantics of supranational identities (see Fig 6),
such as the European one.
At the end of the modelling process, analysis of model fit and distributional assumptions of
the models were computed on residual level– 1 and level– 2 files generated by HLM7 software.
Residual analysis in examining the adequacy of the fitted models shows satisfactory results [31].
Table 5. Final estimation of two levels Bernoulli distributed hierarchical regression with indicator of supranational EU identity as outcome variable
on individual level.
Fixed Effect Coefﬁcient Standard error t-ratio Approx. d.f. p-value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 0,519 0,069 7,536 24 <0,001
HDI, γ01 3,984 1,526 2,610 24 0,015
For AGE slope, β1
INTRCPT2, γ10 -0,004 0,002 -1,663 22821 0,096
For EDUCATER slope, β2
INTRCPT2, γ20 0,658 0,045 14,742 22821 <0,001
For FEMALE slope, β3
INTRCPT2, γ30 -0,133 0,028 -4,745 22821 <0,001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.t005
Fig 6. The hierarchical regressionmodel for the EU supranational identification with statistically significant first and second level regression
coefficients.While controlling for the (significant) effects of age, gender and education, the independent positive effect of HDI on supranational identity was
confirmed as showed in Fig 6.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146584.g006
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Conclusions
National identity does not make nations more or less developed but the levels of national devel-
opment in terms of material welfare, health and education are reflected in certain types of
national identities.We can thus confirm that a certain level of national development generates a
particular type of national identity.
Underdeveloped nations are thus significantly more likely on average to generate strong
ascribed national identities, even when we control for the individual differences based on gen-
der, age, education and immigrant origins. The lack of modernisation and its corresponding
values of general inclusivity, openness, free choice, achievement based meritocracy, etc. would
produce a comparatively closed and exclusivist type of identity based on birth, territory and
religion.
Instrumental supranational identifications, on the other hand, will intensify with the higher
levels of development. We have demonstrated this for the case of the European identity (in
terms of EU citizenship): on average, the Europeans from the more developed member coun-
tries are more likely to indicate their instrumental supranational identification with the EU
while controlling for the individual differences based on gender, age and education. This is
especially notable with regard to the traditional Euro-sceptical attitudes in the U.K. (which is
an actual exception from the rule as a clear outlier with lower EU identification than expected
based on its level of development), Denmark and Sweden as some of the most developed Euro-
pean countries and the significant financial benefits received within the EU by the less devel-
oped member states. Our findings may be explained by the fact that instrumental
supranational identifications presuppose high levels of modern development a confronting the
people with new varieties of complex choices, including them in different and hardly predict-
able social realities—thus making the people more open for new uncertainties, more pragmatic
and instrumental. The instrumental nature of EU supranational identifications reflects this.
Finally, firm voluntarist national identities tell one less about the overall levels of develop-
ment. One can find them either in less developed societies, where they coexist with the ascribed
ones, or in the most developed ones, coexisting with the instrumental supranational identifica-
tions. What makes them closer to the less modern societies may be the firm national belonging.
However, its relative inclusiveness based on the civic instead of the ethnic-tribal criteria, makes
them compatible with developed modern features as well.
Instrumental transnational identifications that may characterise the people of immigrant
origins in particular remain unexplored in our research due to the lack of proper survey data.
However, we have been able to find out in our regression models that being an immigrant (i.e.
with parents not being citizens of the country) makes both voluntarist and oth voluntaristiti-
zens of the countrysignificantly less intensive. This may speak in favour of the (theoretical)
assumption that the immigrants would tend to develop instrumental transnational identifica-
tions instead of classical national identities. Nevertheless, the issue remains open for further
systematic empirical testing.
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